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Bureaucratic Power and Instream Flows 
BERTON L. LAMB 
Eastern Kentucky University 
and 
HARVEY R. DOERKSEN 
Fish and Wfldlife Service 
United States Department of the Interior 
Water resource allocation encompasses two basic categories of water 
use: diversionary and instream use. The diversionary use of waterfalls 
under the rubric of development uses which have long been recognized 
as 'beneficial" both in law and public opinion. Diversionary uses ac-
tually remove water from the stream for irrigation, domestic consump-
tion, and industrial purposes. 
Instream uses, on the other hand, have not historically been recog-
nized as beneficial in state laws. Only recently has there been rising 
concern for retaining water in the streams for maintenance of fish and 
wildlife habitat, recreation, and aesthetic purposes. The concern for 
instream uses reflects a growing interest in protecting a certain quality 
of life. If we value as an important environmental goal the maintenance 
of certain Hows within our natural rivers, then we must make certain, 
in the immediate future, to guarantee a legal right for our citizens to 
those instream Hows. 
In some states even today, state laws permit total appropriation of 
riverflows for out-of-stream uses. Oth er states are beginning to provide 
legal protection for certain instream uses. Nevertheless, the traditional 
legal principle of "first in time, first in right" generally allows only the 
most junior right to instream Hows for fish and wildlife, recreation, and 
aesthetic uses. 
The potential for further protection of instream water rights exists 
in the merging "Federal Reserved Rights" and the quantification of such 
rights, but the impact of this trend is uncertain. 
The concern of this paper is neither the legal developments nor the 
ramifications of changes in the legal environment regarding protection 
of instream Hows. Rather, the paper explores the political/ institutional 
factors regarding instream-flow reservations which are a part of the 
legal environment. 
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The focus of this paper is on public agencies which have some re-
sponsibility for detem1ining instream-flow requirements. This is base d 
on the belief that th e numerous agencies represent a microcosm of the 
larg er political arena in water resources. Water politics for many years 
have been dominated by political interest groups. These groups identify 
selectively with the governmental agencies representing various wa ter 
development and water-use interests. Through the group process and 
Congressional action, the agency's interests are broadly representative of 
the historical societal interests regarding water use and management. 
The new emphasis on a legal right to flowing streams for fish and 
wildlife habitat, recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment is introduced 
into a political environment which long has favored out-of-stream uses 
of water for domestic use and economic gain . The extent to which the 
new demands for instream uses prevail depends in part on legal develop-
ments and in part on the result of interagency bargaining. In this sense, 
agency interrelationships truly represent a microcosm of the broader 
political arena. 
There are a wide range of agencies involved in instream-flow de-
terminations. Most of these agencies have some more or less well-defined 
statutory responsibility or mission orientation that justifies their activities 
relative to instream-flow needs. The major state and federal agencies 
in the Pacific Northwest with some involvement in determining instream-
:flow needs are shown in Table 1. The intent of this table is to provide 
a general basis for identifying the legal or extra legal basis for each 
agency's involvement and to specify the primary areas of concern re-
lating to instream :flows. This table simply specifies a starting poin t 
from which agencies justify involvement in one aspect of public policy 
making . Thus , it represents the first step in analyzing the very complex 
interrelationships among the many agencies. 
The agencies are by no means equal with one another. They diller in 
terms of relative influence, intensity of interest , statutory authority, be-
havioral roles, use orientations, and level of involvement. In short, the 
agencies differ in their relative power vis-a-vis other agencies. The 
extent to which the agencies diller in these regards may very well 
influence substantially the extent to which instream :flows are recognize d 
as a primary water use in an already competitive water allocation 
environment. 
The analysis of agency interactions presented herein is based on a 
survey undertaken during the summer of 1974, funded by the Office of 
Water Research and Technology of the D epartment of the Interior. The 
authors were associated with the State of Washington Water Research 
Center through which the study was coordinated. The findings are based, 
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Agency 
Federal Power 
Commission 
United States 
Forest Service 
Soil Conservation 
Service 
National Marine 
Fisheries Service 
Corps of 
Engineers 
Bureau of 
Indian Affairs 
Bureau of Land 
Management 
Geological 
Survey 
National Parks 
Service 
Bureau of Outdoor 
Recreation 
TABLE 1 
Index of Agencies 
Federal 
Statute 
Federal Power 
Act (PL 74-333, 
49 Stat. 803, 838) 
Organic Act 
1897, Weeks Act 
1911 
P.L.566 
Fish & Wildlife 
Coordination Act 
(16 USC 661 
et seq.), Mitchell 
Act (16 USC 
755 et seq.) 
Flood Control 
Act of 1970; 16 
use 460d; 33 
use 540, 608; 
16 use 661, 662 
The Reservation 
Act 
The Wild & 
Scenic River Act, 
Clean Water 
Restoration Act, 
43 USCA 1361-
1363 
20 stat. 394, 
43 use 31, 
Federal Power 
Act of 1720. 
Survey Order 115 
1925 
16 USCA l; P.L. 
88-577; P.L 
90-542 
Federal Water 
Project Recreation 
Act (16 USCA 
460 L-12 et seq . ) 
Nature af 
Authority 
Licensing 
Land Management 
Study and 
Recommend 
Study and 
Recommend 
Substantive 
Uses (Mission) 
Power, navigation 
Fish & Wildlife, 
Water Quality, 
Domestic Con-
sumption, Aesthetics, 
Recreation 
Agriculture, diver-
sion, irrigation, 
drainage & flow 
control 
Anadromous Fish 
Navigation & Flood Navigation 
Control, Construc-
tion & Management 
Land Management Fish Habitat, 
Agricultural & 
Cultural Diversion 
Land Management Fish & Wildlife 
Habitat, Agricultural 
and Industrial 
diversion 
Study and All Uses 
Recommended 
Land Management Hydroelectric 
Power, Wildlife & 
Fish Habitat, 
Recreation 
Study and Recreation, 
Recommend Aesthetic 
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Agency 
Bureau of 
Reclamation 
Fish & Wildlife 
Service 
Bonneville Power 
Administration 
Coast Guard 
13th Dsitrict 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Region X 
Department of 
Health, Education 
& Welfare 
Pacific Northwest 
River Basin 
Commission 
Department of 
Water Resources 
Fish & Game 
Dept. of Health 
& Welfare 
Dept. of Natural 
Resources and 
Conservation 
( Conservation 
Div.; Division of 
Forestry; Water 
Resources Division) 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
Statute 
43 USCA 41/ff 
and 16 USCA 40 
L-19 
Fish & Wildlife 
Coordination Act 
of 1956; National 
Environmental 
Policy Act; 
Endangered Species 
Act 
Bonneville Project 
Act 
Federal Water 
Pollution Control 
Act of 1972 
( P.L. 92-500); 
and many others 
Federal Water 
Pollution Control 
Act of 1972 
( P.L. 92-500) 
National Environ-
mental Policy Act 
[42 USCA 4332 
(2) (c)]; P.L. 
92-500 
P.L. 89-80 ( 1965) 
Nature of 
Authority 
Physical Regulation 
Study and 
Recommend 
Substantive 
Uses (iMisswn) 
Agricultural 
Diversion, Hydro-
electric Power, Fish 
& Wildlife Habitat 
Fish & Wildlife 
Habitat 
Physical Regulation Hydroelectric 
Power 
Administrative 
Regulation; 
Enforcement 
Administrative 
Regulation; 
Enforcement 
Study and 
Recommend 
Navigation, Water 
Quality 
Water Quality 
Waste Dilution, 
Hydroelectric 
Power, Fish 
Habitat 
Coordination, Study, All Uses 
and Recommend 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Idaho Code 
42-173lff 
Idaho Code 
39-l0Off 
Study Administrative All 
Regulation 
Study and 
Recommend 
Fish & Wildlife 
Habitat 
Study, Administrate, Water Quality 
Regulation 
STATE OF MONTANA 
RCM 89-61.2; 
89-865; 1973 
Montana Water 
Use Act; 1965 
Fish Stream 
Protection Act; 
Floodway Man-
agement Act; 
The Organic Act 
Study & 
Administrative 
Regulation 
All 
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Agency 
Department of 
State Lands 
Department of 
Agriculture 
Department of 
Highways 
Department of 
Game & Fish 
Department of 
Health & Environ-
mental Sciences 
Wat er Quality 
Bureau 
Statute 
See Dept. of 
Natural Resources 
& Conservation 
Senate Bill 444, 
Chapter 452 ( 1973) 
1947 Water 
Pollution Control 
Act ( Chap. 48) 
Nature of' 
Authority 
Study and 
Recommend 
Study and 
Recommend 
Consult, Study & 
Recommend 
Study and 
Recommend; Adm. 
Regulate; On Basis 
of Permit to 
Appropriate rec'd 
from DNRC 
Administrative 
Regulation 
Substantive 
Uses 
Recreation & 
Aesthetics 
Agricultural 
Diversion; Return 
Flows 
Flood Flow; 
Stream Preservation; 
Fish Habitat 
Fish & Wildlife 
Habitat 
Water Quality 
Aesthetics 
STATE OF OREGON 
Water Resources ORS 536.310 
Board 
Wildlife Commission ORS 536.310 
State Engineers ORS 536.548 & 
Coastal Conservation ORS 191 & 140 
& Development 
Commission 
Fish Commission 
Division of 
State Lands 
ORS 509.306 
ORS 541.605-635 
Parks Division ORS 390.805-925 
( of Highway Dept.) 
Department of 
Forestry 
Soil & Water 
Conservation 
Commission 
Health Division 
ORS 527.610-730; 
527-990( 1) 
ORS 568-550( c) 
ORS 448.215, 
235, 265 
Administrative 
Regulation 
Study and 
Recommend 
Enforcement of 
Study and 
Recommend 
Some Administra-
tion; Regulation; 
Study and 
Recommend 
Adm. Regulation; 
Study and 
Recommend 
Consult; Study & 
Recommend 
All 
Fish & Wildlife 
Habitat 
All 
All 
Anadromous & 
Food Fish Habitat 
Fish & Wildlife 
Habitat; Gravel 
Mining 
Water Quality; 
Fish & Wildlife 
Habitat 
Develop & Enforce All 
Forest Practice 
Rules 
Study and Agricultural 
Recommend Diversion 
Surveillance, Study Water Quality 
and Recommend 
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Nature af Substantive 
Agency Statute Authority Uses 
Department of ORS 340ff Study and Admin. All with emphasis 
Environmental Regulation on water quality 
Quality (Water 
Quality Control 
Division & River 
Basin Planning 
Division) 
Port of Portland State Charter Administrative Navigation; 
Regulation Water Quality 
Public Utilities Derived Administrative Domestic Diversion 
Commission Regulation 
STATE OF WASHINGTON 
Department of RCW 90.54, Administrative All 
Ecology 90.22 Regulation 
Department of RCW 90.54, Study and Fish & Wildlife 
Game 90.22 Recommend Habitat 
Department of RCW90.54, Study and Fish & Wildlife 
Fisheries 75.20.050 & Recommend Habitat 
90 .22 
Department of RCW 80.50 Study and Water Quality, 
Commerce & Administrative Waste Discharge 
Economic Regulation for Nuc. Power 
Development Plants 
Highways Consult, Study Flood Control, 
Department, Fish Passage 
Hydraulic Section 
Department of Enabling Act Study and All ( Trustee of 
Natural Resources Recommend State Lands) 
Oceanographic Senate Bill 49 Coordinate, Study Estuarine Uses 
Commission ( Chap . 243) 1967 
Interagency RCW 43.99 Coordinate, Plan Recreation, 
Committee for ( As Amended) Aesthetics, Fish 
Outdoor Recreation & Wildlife Habitat 
Parks & Recreation Derived from Study, Some Recreation Waste 
Commission DOE & Dept. of Administrative Dilution 
Social & Health Regulation 
Services 
Thermal Power RCW 80.50 Study and Thermal Pollution 
Plant Site Recommend and all others 
Evaluation Council 
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in part, on a questionnaire which was sent to all agencies in the Pacific 
Northwest which the investigators believed would have at least marginal 
involvement in instream-flow needs determinations, and in part, on a 
series of interviews and workshops with agency personnel. 
THE INSTREAM FLOW ARENA 
An arena may be thought of as any sphere of interests or activity. It 
is derived from the notion of an amphitheater in which the actors are 
confined to a specific space. The instream flow decision-making arena 
is similarly constrained. Within the general context of water allocation 
in the Pacific Northwest, there are identillable actors, issues, and activities 
which are peculiar to the establishment and maintenance of instream-
flow levels. Moreover, these activities take place within the boundaries 
provided by statute, legal precedent, and tradition. 
The same water cannot be used in the stream and diverted as well. 
Even though there may be return flows to the stream from diversions 
for irrigation , for example, the water is returned in a condition of lower 
quality and lower quantity. Moreover, the water is returned downstream 
of the diversion and sometimes to a different watershed. It is clear that 
diversionary and instream uses are in competition with each other. 
There is also competition among instream uses. Hydroelectric power 
production , for example, is an instream use which requires impoundments 
of water which adversely affect anadromous fish life and natural aesthe-
tics, and may alter recreation potential. When one considers instream re-
quirements for water quality and navigation, the result is seen as a 
complex set of problems requiring a delicate balance of trade-offs, and 
extensive information on the various instrearn needs. To illustrate, 
pooling for hydropower results in an alteration of water temperature 
downstream from the impoundment. This may, as in the case of Oregon's 
Rogue River, improve the trout fishery and reduce the attractiveness of 
the stream for swimming and white-water boating. The impoundment 
itself changes the nature of recreation on the stream , and the peaking 
flows needed for power production may cause the stream to fluctuate 
thousands of cubic feet per second within a short time. This fluctuation 
makes anadromous fish migration difficult, adversely affects commercial 
fishing and other interests, and may render recreational activities severely 
hazardous. 
One major additional source of competition in the Pacific Northwest 
is the potential for out-of-basin diversion. The most famous longstand-
ing out-of-region demand on the Columbia River System is for diversion 
to the arid Southwest While southern California and Arizona may have 
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adequate water supplies at the present, increasing demand coupled with 
a reduction in supply in the Southwest may increase pressures on the 
resources of the Pacillc Northwest. 
All of this competition among the various uses of water is basic to 
the problem of establishing instream-flow levels. The intrinsic element 
of competition among various uses of water is reflected in the develop-
ment of water law and in the growth of agencies charged with ad-
ministering water-related values. Among many others , Charles Sheldon 
has noted that problems in law are a reflection of controversies in the 
society at large. 1 This is certainly the case with law regarding the alloca-
tion of water rights. The nature of competition for water, and the 
emerging body of law favoring instream water rights , set the stage on 
which water resource agencies will enact a drama which both reflects, 
and impacts , the water resources controversies in the society at large. 
INTERAGENCY BARGAINING AND AGENCY POWER 
The multitude of agencies with some responsibility for determining 
instream flow needs clearly are not equal to their ability to achieve their 
own objectives. Any instream-flow level established by a single agency for 
its own mission-oriented use will impinge to some extent upon the water 
uses promoted by other agencies. The outcome of public policy, that is, 
the specillc decisions regarding instream-flow reservations, will be subject 
to the relative agency power ( ability to achieve agency objectives) of 
the several agencies in the decision arena. Interagency bargaining is an 
important mode of decision making in this arena of uncertainty caused 
by changing laws and public opinion , but the tools for bargaining are 
distributed unequally among the agencies. 
There are several determinants of agency power relative to other 
agencies which relate to the potential outcome of instream-flow policy. 
Each is enumerated in tum with suggestions of its potential impact. 
Statutory Responsibility 
There are substantial differences in the statutory responsibility held 
by agencies for instream-flow needs. At the federal level, no single 
agency has statutory authority to be the sole federal agency responsible 
for setting instream-flow levels and to enforce those levels on other 
federal and state agencies. At the same level, statutory responsibility in 
Idaho is an administrative "policy" which identifies instream-flow needs 
as beneficial uses of water, but which lacks constitutional authority. The 
administrative policy bas recently been tested in court , but no single 
1 "Introduction," in Charles H. Sheldon, Ed., The Supreme Court: Politicians 
in Robes ( Beverly Hills, California: Glencoe Press, 1970), p. ix . 
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agency in Idaho has statutory responsibility to set minimum flows. In 
Washington, the state legislature has designated instream flow as a 
beneficial use, and requires the State Department of Ecology to establish 
minimum-flow levels for streams within the state. Statutes in Oregon 
and Montana fall between these two extremes. 
In general, the stronger the statutory mandate for involvement in 
mstream flow needs, the greater will be the power of the agency and the 
more intense will be its involvement, other things being equal. Of 
course, the other things seldom are equal and their impact on agency 
power is noted below. 
In the study, we identified three types or levels of activity based on 
statutory authority. One type is formal or informal consultation with 
other agencies regarding waterflow requirements. This level of activity 
normally does not require specific statutory authority, but can relate 
to an agency's overall mission. Involvement at this level may not re-
quire a methodology for determining instream-flow needs, but may be 
based on preferences and agency values. 
The second type, or level, of activity-Study and recommendation of 
appropriate waterflow requirements-carries with it a greater degree 
of relative power than formal or informal consultation. At this level, 
some kind of instream-flow needs methodology is appropriate. Acquisition 
of data also is implicit in the definition. It can safely be assumed that 
agencies operating at this level will study and recommend appropriate 
waterflow requirements in terms of their own mission. For example, a 
Detpartment of Fisheries would be interested in recommending waterflow 
requirements for £sh habitat, without regard to instream flow needs for 
other uses. 
The highest level of agency activity is the administrative regulation 
of waterflow requirements. The statutory authority for this level of ac-
tivity may be either speci£c or derived from a more general regulatory 
authorization. 
Table 2 shows those agencies which frequently are involved in each 
of the three types of instream-flow activity. One immediate observation 
is that a greater number of agencies are involved at the lower levels of 
activity and fewer agencies are involved when the level of activity ap-
proaches administrative regulation. The nature of responses differs by 
instream use, but the trend is toward reduced frequency of involvement 
as the intensity of activity increases. 
Table 3 shows that the frequency of involvement is a function of the 
particular instream use in question. For example, approximately 38% of 
the agencies indicate frequent involvement in consultation with other 
TABLE 2 
Percentage of Agencies Frequently Involved in 
Instream Uses, by Level of Activity 
Waste Hydro- Fish Wildlife 
Level of Activity Navigation Dilution Power Habitat Habitat 
Consultation With Other Agencies . .. ... 37.7% 50.7% 45.5% 76.6% 66.3% 
Study and Recommendation of 
Appropriate Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.9% 41.6% 31.2% 66.3% 58.5% 
Administrative Regulation of Flows . . . . . . . . 10.4% 22.1% 23.4% 33.8% 26.0% 
:t 
._ 
I 
0 
.., 
Recreation Aesthetics 
75.4% 67.6% 
"'O Other o 
7.8% § 
65.0% 53.2% 6.5% ~ 
24.7% 20.8% 0% en 
i 
~ 
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TABLE 3 
Percentage of Agencies Which Frequently Consult With 
Other Agencies on Instream Uses 
45 
Type of Instream Use % of Agencies 
Navigation . . . . ..... .. .... . ........ 37.7 
Waste Dilution ............ . .......... . 
Hydropower .... .. . .... .... .. .. . ...... . ...... . 
Fish Habitat .... . ... .. . .. ................... . . . 
Wildlife Habitat ............ . ....... .. .. . 
Recreation .... .... ... . .... . .......... . . 
Aesthetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
50.7 
45.5 
76.6 
66.3 
75.4 
67.6 
agencies regarding navigation. Given the nature of the use, and the 
relatively fewer agencies with statutory responsibility for navigation, it 
is not surprising to find that few agencies are involved in this particular 
use. Instream flow for fish habitat, by contrast, is an area in which 
76.6% of the agencies repmted frequent involvement at the level of 
consultation and nearly 34% at the level of administrative regulation. 
This may, of course, be a function of the requirement that environmental 
impact statements be prepared for proposed projects. Another possible 
interpretation is that the legal and political atmosphere among water 
resource agencies requires that they take some of the emerging instream 
uses into account in their planning programs. The fact that so many 
agencies do recognize some statutory responsibility for these uses sug-
gests that they will be potentially considered in water planning and 
development activities. 
Ability to Physically Control Stream Flows 
Some agencies, such as the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Re-
clamation , and the Bonneville Power Administration are in a position to 
physically regulate the stream flows by the use of dams. This ability 
to physically regulate the stream places these agencies in an enviable 
position with regard to their ability to establish and enforce instream 
flow levels consistent with their own missions . By contrast, agencies 
such as Fish and Game Departments may have an intense interest for 
setting flow levels for fish, but these agencies must depend upon ade-
quate runoff or favorable bargaining with the agencies which administer 
dams. Agencies controlling regulating facilities more easily can have the 
final say on regulated streams. They attempt to cooperate with agencie s 
responsible for other instream-flow uses, but also must heed first their 
statutory mandate to pursue a particular mission. 
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With regard to the emerging instream uses, the agencies with the 
ability to physically control streamflows have not historically had a good 
track record for adequately considering fish, wildlif e, recreation, and 
aesthetic values. Economic considerations , through cost/benefit analysis, 
along with considerations of political feasibility, typically have been 
the overriding criteria under which proj ects were justified. Fish and 
wildlife agencies have historically been in a weak bargaining position in 
recommending Hows to be maintained below dams. 
Given our experience with the past , and the generaliz ed tendency for 
bureaucracies to develop new values slowly or not at all, development 
philosophies antagonistic to fish and wildlife, recreation and aesthetics 
may be expected to continue. Public opinion , reflected in the recent 
"environmental movement" and embodied in the National Environmental 
Policy Act may render the bargaining power of fish and wildlife and 
recreation agencies more substantial vis-a-vis construction agencies. One 
disconcerting note in the study was that power and flood control agencies 
-those typically in the construction business-tend to have very limited 
contacts with other agencies and reported consulting primarily with 
each other. To the extent that this is a general occurrence, agencies 
representing fish and wildlife, recreation and aesthetic values can an-
ticipate little input into the water development planning process. 
Agency Mission 
lnstream How needs are central to the mission of some agencies. For 
example, agencies dealing with fisheries and navigation are keenly in-
terested in instream Hows. The extent to which instream How is central 
to the agency mission seems to be an important determinant of intensity 
of involvement. Some agencies , such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency and the Bureau of Reclamation , tend to be less directly involved 
in instream-flow needs in general , but for specific issues which directly 
impinge upon their missions, they may become intensely involved. 
High level of involvement may help to insure that a particular agency's 
goals be considered , if not adopted ( Squeaky Wheel Proverb). 
Designation as Implementing Agency 
Some states have designated a single agency as having the responsi-
bility for setting and implementing flow levels for all uses. In such cases, 
this central agency becomes a broker and must decide on flow levels on 
the basis of a variety of sources, including any instream-flow uses pro-
moted by the central agency itself. The agency thus has an advantage 
over other agencies, but is subject to many political pressures to which 
it must respond. 
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As a corollary to this, agencies with responsibility to grant water 
rights possess an important tool preserving instream flows through non-
appropriation. In the State of Washington, this tool has been used with 
some measure of success by the Department of Ecology. The Department 
has simply withdrawn certain streams from further appropriation. Partly 
because of statutes, and partly because of tradition, some states by 
conh·ast are oriented to granting water rights permits up to ( and in some 
cases exceeding) full appropriation. Regardless of how the potential 
tool of non-appropriation has been used historically, the statutory au-
thority to control water rights places certain agencies in a better position 
to implement and enforce instream-flow levels, or to prevent the im-
plementation and enforcement of such flows. 
For the federal agencies, this determinant of power does not apply. 
Each federal agency operates within the general bounds of its own 
mission and statutory responsibilities, but no single federal agency has 
the authority to act as broker for the others in the arena of instream flows. 
Land Ownership 
Public land managers, such as the Forest Service, seem to be much 
more able to deal with instream-flow needs than agencies which do not 
own large tracts of land. In addition to its land ownership, the Forest 
Service has statutory responsibility to determine the water requirements 
within national forest boundaries. The combination of these two factors 
enables the Forest Service to make decisions which can impinge on 
other water management agencies downstream ( both the state and 
federal) but without some of the interagency conflicts which normally 
would occur. 
In the future, we expect that land ownership by federal agencies will 
become increasingly important as a determinant of agency power as the 
legal aspects of the Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine unfold. Combined 
with the Federal Reserved Rights, any successful attempts in the future 
to require quantification of federal agency water requirements may sub-
stantially impact the extent of reservation for instream uses. 
Methodological Sophistication for Data Acquisition 
There are striking diHerences between agencies with regard to their 
ability to produce data supportive of their instream-flow needs. For 
example, flow needs and incremental impacts for power production and 
navigation can be determined with relative accuracy, in contrast to 
flow needs for water-based recreation or fish spawning. 
In a survey of all agencies, the fish and wildlife, recreation/ aesthetic, 
and land management agencies most frequently recommend data de-
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velopment for improved instream-flow decisions. Because the emerging 
instream uses have not enjoyed statutory support over a long period of 
time, the need for data to justify decisions is particularly acute. By 
contrast, the power and flood control agencies surveyed were far less 
likely to recommend data development for improved stream-flow de-
cisions. 
Public Support 
Agencies enjoy variable levels of public support for their m1ss1on. 
To the extent that an agency has strong public backing for its goals 
and objectives, the agency will have greater ability to enforce instream-
flow levels consistent with its mission. This factor accounts for the sub-
stantial public support enjoyed by many state water rights agencies in 
fully appropriating water to beneficial uses. For example, in the Pacific 
Northwest over the past century, water appropriation for irrigation has 
been strongly supported by the vocal and powerful agriculture-related 
groups. 
Favorable to the emerging instream-flow uses is the recent "environ-
mental movement" in which public attention has been brought to bear 
by public interest groups antagonistic to the prevailing values of the 
past. To the extent that public concern over the environment continues, 
fish and wildlife and recreation agencies will enjoy strengthened bargain-
ing positions. Such support may be bolstered through such mechanisms 
as the "principles and standards" promulgated by the Water Resources 
Council. These mechanisms simply reflect through adminish·ative and 
legislative channels public concerns expressed in the environmental move-
ment. 
Economic Importance 
Those water uses which have a widely recognized economic import-
ance enable their "advocate agencies" to enjoy greater confidence pursu-
ing their goals. For example, power or irrigation development agencies 
are in a much more favorable position than agencies such as the Environ-
mental Protection Agency or the Fish and Wildlife Service, whose water 
use demands may be antagonistic to, or at least neutral with regard to, 
traditional economic development. 
Agency Resources 
In general, those agencies with large operating budgets and per-
sonnel seem to be more able to compete in the arena of setting and 
enforcing instream flows than agencies with lesser resources. In large 
measure , the relative agency resources reflects public and political sup-
port of an agency as expressed through the budgetary process. 
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INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FACTORS 
One way of conceptualizing the interaction among the several de-
terminants of power is illustrated in Figure 1. In the figure, relative 
agency power is expressed as a function of an agency's administrative 
regulatory authority, physical regulatory ability, and intensity of interest 
( a function of agency mission). To the extent that a particular agency 
possesses regulatory capabilities and is intense in pursuance of its ob-
jectives, it possesses power vis-a-vis other agencies. For example, the 
Corps of Engineers would fall in the cell represented by yes-active/ 
yes-active. That agency is powerful because it has administrative au-
thority, physical capability, and is actively interested in both. This multi-
dimensional framework could be broadened to include the other de-
terminants of power as well. According to this framework, the various 
determinants are additive, although in actual practice some are more 
important than others. 
Administrative Regulatory Authority 
YES NO 
Intensity of Interest Intensity of Interest 
Active Passive Active Passive 
c Active 4 3 
a 
~ YES p.. 
Cl! 
C) 
Passive ~ 2 1 
0 
~ 
1c Active Q.) 3 2 
,::i:; 
ti! NO CJ 
..... 
"' >. Passive ~ ~ 1 0 
FIGURE 1. Agency Power as a Function of an Administrative Regulatory Authority, 
Physical Regulatory Capability, and Agency Interest. 
NO'rE: The numbers in each cell indicate relative power. Higher numbers indicate 
greater ability of an agency to achieve its own objectives vis-a-vis agencies. 
Some cells are left empty in this conceptualization to indicate the very low 
likelihood that any agency could be found to fit the category. 
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SUMMARY 
In summary, public agencies involved in instream-How needs in the 
West are clearly not on equal footing with regard to enforcing their 
own missions. There are a variety of factors which enable some agencies 
to exercise greather authority than others. In a given situation, the com-
bination of these "interagency power" factors appears to be an important 
determinant of the instream-How policies which are eventually adopte d 
and implemented. 
As in many other aspects of water use and development, decisions 
are made in an atmosphere of conflict and bargaining. There is no 
single, comprehensive, unified process for making water-allocation deci-
sions. For the many interest groups advocating various water uses, there 
are parallel public agencies espousing the same goals. The outcome of 
the current struggle is impossible to predict. 
The situation is one in which certain instream uses, particularly fish 
and wildlife, recreation and aesthetics, have not traditionally been 
afforded legal protection. In the recent past, there have been several 
developments in water laws which offered to these uses a greater degree 
of protection than previously had existed. The legal situation is con-
stantly changing and legal doctrines in this arena continue to emerge. 
Yet, even where some states currently are providing by state statute 
or administrative policy some protection for instream values, these rights 
are inferior to those of the long-held, traditional-use, diversionary rights. 
Increasing protection of instream uses through law is only part of the 
battle. The degree to which environmental values afforded by instream 
Hows are to be protected effectively will be determined to a substantial 
extent by the strength with which the advocate agencies pursue their 
goals. In the interagency arena of conflict over water resources, the 
agencies espousing instream Hows for fish and wildlife, recreation, and 
aesthetics are not overly blessed with determinants of power. Selective 
use of power in priority situations may enable these agencies to take 
positive strides toward the protection of the natural environment. 
